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it did not specifically say anything that could be construed as supporting
such doctrine; it did not cite any authority supporting such a doctrine. It
is noteworthy that the principal case, apparently, is not decided on the
3
basis of fraud.
Section 70a (4) stated briefly by the court is of no assistance in this
case. This subdivision states what property rights of the bankrupt passes
to the trustee. Nothing contained therein operates to extinguish the extent
of the validity of an encumbrance on property of the bankrupt. The lien
in the present case can no more be said to be void than it can be said to
be valid. To say a lien is void impliedly precludes the possibility of any
validity. Each term used unqualifiedly, excludes the other. The lien here
was valid to some extent and void to some extent.
The court goes on to say "by section 67 a claim which for want of
record or for other reasons would not have been valid liens as against
the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not be liens against his
estate." It may be plausibly argued that since the mortgage was a "valid
lien as against the claims of 'some' of the creditors of the bankrupt,"
67a does not apply. If in reply to this it is contended that this would
be reading something into 67a arbitrarily, so as to make it read "claims
which * * * would not have been valid liens as against all the creditors * * * shall not be valid liens * * *," then the same argument would nullify the contention that 67a must read "claim which * * *
would not have been valid liens as against some of the creditors * * *
shall not be valid liens * * *." It would seem that when "the creditors" of a person are spoken of generally, all the creditors are those to
whom it is thus referred. It is submitted that a sound restatement of
67a would be this: Any claim which for any reason would not have been
a valid lien as against the claims of all the creditors of the bankrupt, excluding the claimant, shall not be a lien against the bankrupt's estate. The
exclusion of the claimant in this statement does not add anything which
is not by necessary inference in 67a.
S. K.

CONSTITuTIONAL LAw-VESTED RIGHT IN REMEDY-The appellant was
indicted on September 12, 1930, for the alleged robbery of a bank on
August 26, 1927. At the time of the commission of the alleged offense section 20, c. 6, Acts of 1905-Section 2052, Burns' 1926--provided that
prosecutions for such offenses must be commenced within two years. On
May 19, 1929, the above statute was repealed by section 1, c. 198, Acts
of 1929, which provided that the period of limitation should be enlarged to
five years. The appellant contends that the prosecution was barred by
the statute of limitations that was in effect at the time of the commission
of the offense. Held, the prosecution is not barred; statutes of limitations
pertain to remedy, and there is no vested right in a remedy or mode of
procedure.1
aSee further, on 70a (4) In re Mullen (1900), 101 Fed. 413, where the court
held that 70e (4) did not preclude the gaining of rights superior to the trustees;
this is mentioned only to show that 70a (4) does not confer an unlimited right.
1 Streepy v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, October 13, 1931, 177 N. E. 897.

RECENT CASE NOTES
Undoubtedly this decision is upheld by the weight of authority. The
cases seem to establish the universal rule that a person has no vested
right in a remedy or mode of procedure, and that the legislature may
impair, modify, or remove either. The cases asserting this doctrine have
allowed the legislature to modify and impair existing remedies, to remove
particular remedies, to substitute one remedy for another, to make one
of several remedies the exclusive remedy, to change a legal proceeding to
one in equity, and the converse. 2 In furthering the doctrine, courts have
allowed pending cases on appeal to be transferred from one court to
another, and justified their decisions on the grounds that an individual
has no vested right in a remedy or mode of procedure, and that such may
be changed at any time before the final adjudication of the suit.3
The courts have generally held that a person has no vested right in the
operation of a statute of limitations. Under this category the cases have
distinguished between cases where the statute has not completely run,
and those where it has completely run. Under the first class of cases
the courts hold that the legislature may enlarge, shorten, or remove the
period of limitation altogether; while in the second class of cases the
courts say that the person has a vested right, and that such right can not
be taken away by a subsequent change or removal of the statutory bar.4
The cases establishing this doctrine say also that even though an individual has no vested right in a remedy or mode of procedure, the legislature cannot remove all remedy or mode of procedure, but that it must
leave or substitute some real substantial remedy or mode of procedure. 5
It is at least contradictory to say that a person has no right in a remedy
or mode of procedure, and that change of such remedies is within the
discretion of the legislature, and then in the same doctrine add that the
legislature cannot remove the entire remedy and substitute no other, but
that they must leave the person a real and substantial remedy. This
seems arbitrary in itself.
2Sage v. State (1890), 127 Ind. 15, 26 N. E. 667; Ex parte France (1911), 176
Ind. 72, 95 N. E. 515; In re Petition to Transfer Appeals (1931), 202 Ind. 349,
174 N. E. 812; Crane v. Hahlo (1921), 258 U. S. 142, 42 S. Ct. 214; Thorne v. Silver
(1910), 174 Ind. 504, 92 N. E. 339; Bost v. CabarrusCounty (1910), 151 N. C. 531,
27 S. E. 1066; Rich v. Flanders (1859), 39 X. H. 304; .Rhines v. Clark (1865),
51 Pa. 96; Lockett v. Usrj (1859), 28 Ga. 345; Williar v. Baltimore (1876), 45 Md.
546; Ryan v. Allen (1924), 312 Ill. 250, 143 N. E. 852; Irvine v. Elliot (1913), 203
Fed. 82; Martin v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. (1906), 203 U. S. 284, 27 S. Ct. 100;
Ettor v. Tacoma (1912), 228 U. S. 148, 33 S. Ct. 428; Lake Superior v. Auditor
(1890), 79 Mich. 351, 44 N. W. 616; George v. Everhart (1883), 57 Wis. 397, 15
N. W. 387; Shickel v. Berryville (1901), 99 Va. 88, 37 S. E. 813.
'In re Petition to Transfer Appeals (1931), 202 Ind. 349, 174 N. E. 812; Teel v.
Chesapeake, etc. (1913), 204 Fed. 918, 123 C. C. A. 240; Zellars v. Nat'l Surety Co.
(1908), 210 Mo. 86, 108 S. W. 548.
'fDavis v. Industrial Accident Comm. (1926), 198 Cal. 631, 246 Pac. 1046; Right
v. Martin (1858), 11 Ind. 123; Snasberry v. Hughes (1910), 174 Ind. 638, 92 N. E.
783; Morris v. Tripp (1900), 111 Iowa 115, 82 N. W. 610; Milbourne v. Kelley
(1915), 93 Kan. 753, 145 Paa. 816; Kinsman v. Cambridge (1877), 121 Mass. 558;
Eingartnerv. Ill. Steel Co. (1899), 103 Wis. 373, 79 N. W. 433; Edelstein v. Carlile
(1904), 33 Colo. 54, 78 Paa. 680.
5Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Edition), p. 757, and p. 761; Thorn v.
Silver (1910), 174 Ind. 504, 92 N. E. 339; Crane v. Hahlo (1921), 258 U. S. 142,
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The phrase "vested rights" is a property term, and, when used in
connection with one's right to a remedy, is inaccurate, because in this
sense, it means those interests which the state must recognize and protect,
and which cannot be taken from the individual arbitrarily.
It is undisputed that the Federal Constitution gives the person a right
to a remedy and adequate mode of procedure. This, like any other right,
may be impaired or taken away in situations where some social interest
becomes paramount to the individual right. But, unless some sufficient
social interest is shown, the legislature has no power to impair or deprive
a person of these rights, and in case the legislature insists on so doing,
its effort would be unconstitutional under the due process or equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution. This doctrine was pronounced
in Truax v. Corrigan,6 where a statute that deprived the appellant of the
right to an injunction in cases of strikes and boycotts by employees was
held unconstitutional.
Since the use of the phrase "vested rights" in connection with the
present subject, is in itself an anomalous usage, and the cases promulgating the doctrine of no vested right in a remedy or mode of procedure
recognize some sort of a right to some remedy, the rationale along this line
seems to be a bit arbitrary. Even if we admit that a person has a vested
right in a thing, it would still be capable of being impaired or changed if
the legislature could find some social interest, in favor of the impairment
or change, which would be sufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court of the
United States that the due process clause had been satisfied. It is a
treadmill of reasoning to justify the changing of a remedy or mode of
procedure by the doctrine of no vested right in such remedy when the
same change could be made even though there was a vested right, if the
legislature could find a sufficient social interest in the change. The only
question in these cases should be; is this right protected under the constitution, and if so, is there sufficient social interest for the modification
of such right? This doctrine would be a logical and rational solution of
the problem. It would recognize the rights secured in the Constitution,
but would allow the reasonable modification of such rights where social
A. C. J.
interest found it necessary.
CONTRACTS--BREACH DIsTNGuIsHED FRoM REscssioN-The plaintiff,
Rose M. Kirkpatrick, and her husband, John Kirkpatrick, entered into a
written contract with the defendant wherein the defendant agreed to
sell and the Kirkpatricks to buy a certain vacant lot for the agreed price
of $1,774.51, to be paid in printing as demanded from time to time by the
defendant. John Kirkpatrick died after there had been paid in printing,
the sum of $1,072.93. Rose M. Kirkpatrick qualified as administratrix of
his estate and printing services were rendered by the'estate and applied
upon the contract as follows: March 31, 1928, $317.50; May 16, 1928,
$308; August 21, 1928, $76.08. The total amount of the services so rendered was $1,774.51. On April 23, 1928, after the execution of the contract and before the last two payments on the contract were made, the
42 S. Ct. 214; Rich v. Flanders (1859), 39 N. .EL304; 'Williar v. Baltimore (1876),
45 Md. 546; Lockett -. Usry (1859), 28 Ga. 345; Rhines v. Clarke (1865), 51 Pa.
96; Boat v. Cabbarus County (1910), 151 X. C. 531, 27 S. E. 1066.
6 (1921) 257 U. S. 312.

